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Francesco Malandrino, Member, IEEE, Claudio Casetti, Member, IEEE, Carla-Fabiana
Chiasserini, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We consider a network of electric vehicles (EVs)
and its components: vehicles, charging stations, and coalitions
of stations. For such a setting, we propose a model in which
individual stations, coalitions of stations and vehicles interact
in a market revolving around the energy for battery recharge.
We start by separately studying (i) how autonomously-operated
charging stations form coalitions; (ii) the price policy enacted
by such coalitions; (iii) how vehicles select the charging station
to use, pursuing a time/price tradeoff. Our main goal is to
investigate how equilibrium in such a market can be reached.
We also address the issue of computational complexity, showing
that, through our model, equilibria can be found in polynomial
time.
We evaluate our model in a realistic scenario, focusing on
its ability to capture the advantages of the availability of
an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) supporting the EV
drivers. The model also mimics the anticompetitive behavior that
charging stations are likely to follow, and it highlights the effect
of possible countermeasures to such a behavior.
Index Terms—ITS, charging station selection, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is now an established tenet of transportation technology
that Electric Vehicles (EVs) will, at some point in the future,
replace vehicles propelled by fossil fuel. Environmentally-
friendly by definition, EVs enjoy favorable attention by in-
dustry and governments alike. Indeed, the mass production
and widespread adoption of EVs seem around the corner if
some concerns are overcome, such as short driving range, lack
of recharging infrastructure and long charging time. The latter
two issues will likely determine the gradual phasing-out of old-
fashioned gas pumps in favor of public charging stations. It is
thus to be expected that electric outlets will start cropping up at
the curbside, in parking lots as well as in cab stands. However,
the fact that someone will deploy and operate such charging
stations is often taken for granted. In this work, we take a
closer look at this issue, arguing that charging stations will be
deployed and operated only if their owners find it profitable
for themselves. Similarly, the drivers of electric vehicles will
select the charging station to use pursuing their own benefit:
a shorter trip time, a cheaper price, or both. Note that the trip
time includes the detour time from the vehicle original route
to a charging station and back, the wait time there, and the
service time.
We present a model that captures the behavior of the
two main actors involved in such a dynamic energy market,
namely:
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• the electric vehicles, i.e., their drivers;
• the charging stations, i.e., their owners.
Additionally, our model accounts for coalitions that charging
stations may form, and their commercial strategies. Each of
these actors pursues different, potentially conflicting, objec-
tives. And, each of them is likely to change its behavior
as a consequence of the actions the others take – or are
expected to take. By exploiting game theory, we then describe
a polynomial-complex algorithm to find an operational point
for such a model, which turns out to be a Nash equilibrium [1].
Our model represents a novel contribution in two ways. For
starters, it is the first to jointly address the behavior of charging
stations and vehicles, as well as the interaction between buy
and sell energy prices. Furthermore, we specifically address
the issue of the computational cost of finding an equilibrium,
and attain a complexity that is polynomial in the number
of charging stations (note that finding a Nash equilibrium
is, in general [1], NP-hard). Such an issue is traditionally
disregarded by economists, who tend to focus on proving
that an equilibrium exists rather than designing a way to
compute it. In engineering applications, instead, it is crucial
that large-scale scenarios are analyzed quickly, if not in real-
time. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the main
focus of our model is to study the steady-state equilibrium,
as opposed to the dynamics of the transient. This is justified
by the features of the scenario we deal with, e.g., the slow
pace at which prices change.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review
previous work in Section II, while we describe the system
model in Section III. In Section IV, we discuss the players,
moves and payoffs of the related game, whose computational
issues are dealt with in Section V. We test our model in
the scenario described in Section VI, obtaining the results
described in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, both the academic and industrial communities
have devoted a great deal of interest to EVs and charging
station deployment.
As an example, in [2] Ferreira et al. consider the case
where the behavior of EV drivers, i.e., whether they drive to
the closest or the cheapest charging station, depends on their
profile (age or gender). Similarly, [3] describes an intelligent
transportation system (ITS) to support drivers in the selection
of the charging station, accounting for the fact that they will act
selfishly, and providing strategy-compatible suggestions. The
work in [4], instead, accounts for real-time charging prices and
envisions a centralized control of the EV’s charging schedule
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so as to minimize user costs. An analytic model for the study
of the EVs trip time is presented in [5]. The road topology
is modeled as a graph whose edges are associated with a
fixed waiting time, and a lower bound to the charging time
is derived. With respect to our work, however, the study in [5]
does not account for the strategic behavior of vehicles.
Such an issue is addressed in [6], which presents a set of
decentralized policies assigning vehicles to charging stations
and yielding socially optimal equilibria. A multi-objective
decision-making model is also presented in [7], where the
gas station selection depends on the driver personalized re-
quirements and the gasoline price, and it aims at minimizing
the travel distance and the refueling cost. In these works,
however, individual EV routing and charging are optimized
through standard techniques, and the effect of such decisions
on each other is not taken into account.
Several works, e.g., [8]–[16], are mostly concerned with
the impact of EVs on the power grid. In particular, the study
in [10] assumes the presence of a central controller that
predicts the EVs mobility and advises each EV about which
charging station to use and when, so as to even the power
demand over time. The work in [10], however, assumes that
vehicles always follow the central controller’s suggestions.
Similarly, the goal of [12] is to ensure that EVs can obtain the
energy they need to recharge their batteries without impairing
the stability of the power grid. The study in [12] accounts
for the behavior of EV drivers and aims at influencing it by
means of monetary incentives. The work in [13] envisions that
smart grids shall distinguish regular and EV-induced loads, and
optimize the way such loads are served. In a similar setting, the
authors of [14] propose a queue-based model for smart grids
serving EVs, and use it to find the optimal size of local energy
stores at charging stations. In [15], a centralized optimization
problem and a low-complexity heuristic are presented with the
aim to adjust EV charging to real-time prices and the power
grid load.
The study in [16] is closer to our approach, indeed it
accounts for both charging time and energy costs. With an
emphasis on charging stations (as opposed to vehicle drivers),
the authors present an optimal way to handle the EV load on
the power grid, as well as a greedy heuristics.
As mentioned, to our knowledge, our work is the first
that jointly investigates the behavior of charging stations and
vehicles, as well as the interaction between buy and sell energy
prices while taking into account its complexity.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We aim at modeling a realistic scenario featuring electric
vehicles travelling on an urban road topology where several
charging stations are available for battery refill. Our model
captures both vehicle and station viewpoints in a dynamic
energy market setting. When its battery is depleted, a vehicle
stops at one of the charging stations. The choice of the
station must weigh the monetary service cost and the expected
incurred delay (detour, waiting and service time). All stations
can sell energy at a price of their own choice, accounting for
demand and expected revenue, but they have to buy energy at
market prices. Stations may also have the option of forming
coalitions, aiming at lowering the buying price and at driving
selling prices up to increase their revenues.
Our model hinges upon two kinds of agents: vehicles v ∈ V
and charging stations c ∈ C. Their behavior is detailed in III-A
and III-B, respectively. Notice that set V only contains those
vehicles that are interested in changing their battery during
their trip. The other vehicles do not take part in the market
and simply contribute to the road traffic, just like ordinary,
fossil-fueled vehicles do. Such an effect is accounted for in
the computation of the trip time, as detailed later in the paper.
We assume that batteries are replaced, not charged. This
is due to the exceedingly long charging times of current
and (likely) future technologies, and is consistent with early
deployments [17]. As a consequence, charging stations can
express buy and sell energy prices, bc and sc, respectively,
in dollars per battery replacement instead of, for example,
dollars per kilojoule. We focus on a given time period of the
day characterized by uniform battery replacement demand and
vehicular traffic conditions, and we consider that prices are
kept constant during such period.
A. Vehicles
Vehicles are associated to an origin and a destination point
on the road topology. During their trip, they stop at exactly one
charging station among the possible ones, in order to replace
their battery.
Let αv, ωv and ηv be, respectively, the points on the road
topology marking the origin of trip of vehicle v, its destination
and the point where its driver becomes aware that a battery
replacement is needed. Also, let λc be the location of charging
station c. Then, each vehicle v will select a charging station
pursuing a tradeoff between cost and expected incurred delay.
Specifically, EVs will try to optimize the following objective:
min
c∈C
{sc +K · [t(αv, ηv) + t(ηv, λc) + wc + t(λc, ωv)]} (1)
where:
• sc is the battery replacement cost at station c;
• t(x1, x2) is the travel time between locations x1 and x2,
with x1 = αv, ηv, λc and x2 = ηv, λc, ωv;
• wc is the waiting plus service time at station c;
• K is a coefficient used to convert time into cost. Indeed,
while sc is a cost, all other terms represent time periods.
In particular, note that the sum of terms multiplied by K
represents the total time it will take to the vehicle to go from its
origin to its destination, including the detour to and from the
charging stating, the waiting time there and the service time.
Thus, K can be read as the value of time as perceived by the
drivers: ifK = 10 EUR/h, drivers will be willing to spend one
more hour reaching a farther charging station and/or waiting
at a more crowded one if they can save at least 10 EUR on
their replacement price. In other words, very high values of K
mean that drivers are willing to pay any price to shorten their
trip. Low values mean that they prefer the cheapest station, no
matter how far away or crowded it may be. Also, we stress that
time wc depends on the number of service stalls at the station,
the service time, and the number of customers that a vehicle
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finds upon arriving at the station. A closed-form expression of
wc is provided in the Appendix.
Vehicles with no ITS support: Most of the parameters in
(1) are static or only change occasionally (e.g., the energy
prices for the tagged time period may change once a day).
To correctly account for such values while optimizing their
objectives, vehicles do not need information from ITS. As an
example, the up-to-date energy prices could be downloaded
from the Internet upon starting the trip.
Conversely, the waiting times wc’s cannot be estimated a
priori, as they depend on the decisions of all the other players.
Therefore, vehicles with no ITS support will have to make
their decisions, i.e., optimizing objective (1), without taking
the waiting times into account. Without loss of generality, in
the following we consider that such vehicles assume1 wc =
0, ∀c.
B. Charging stations
Each charging station c buys energy at a price bc per
replacement, and sells it at a price sc. Additionally, stations
have to pay a fixed cost fc, i.e., a lump sum accounting
for taxes, maintenance and labor costs. Unless coalitions are
formed, as explained below, each station is free to decide its
charging price. A station can thus increase the price in order
to have a higher revenue, or decrease it in order to attract more
costumers. Demand, i.e., the number of vehicles on the road
topology that need to replace their battery, is a major factor
determining the prices. As we focus on a given time period
of the day, our model does not explicitly account for time-
varying prices. However, as shown in Section VII, the model
can be used to study different demand conditions.
Stations may form coalitions, for the purpose of obtaining
a bulk rate from energy suppliers on their buy price bc, and to
enforce a common pricing strategy. We denote by K the set
of coalitions that are formed and by kc the coalition to which
station c belongs. Also, Ac and Akc indicate the attendance
(i.e., the number of vehicles headed to it) of station c and of
its coalition, respectively. At the outset, kc ≡ c for all stations,
i.e., each station belongs to a coalition formed by itself only
(and, clearly, Akc = Ac). Stations cannot belong to more than
one coalition at the same time.
Joining a coalition has two effects: on the one hand, the
price bc that station c is charged when buying energy may be
lowered, as explained in III-C. On the other hand, station c
forfeits its freedom to decide the selling price sc. Indeed, the
price policy within each coalition κ is determined so as to
maximize the coalition revenue, i.e., to optimize the following
objective:
max
∑
c∈C:kc=κ
scAc. (2)
We indicate with k0 the virtual coalition formed by those
stations that do not participate in the market, i.e., that are “not
operating”. Stations in k0 have attendance Ac = 0, and do not
pay the fixed cost fc.
1Note that assuming any other constant value for wc would be equivalent.
C. Energy price
We do not make any specific assumption on the presence
of one or more energy suppliers. However, we do assume
that the buy price bc charged to a station c depends on the
amount of energy bought by its coalition, i.e., on the coalition-
wise attendance Akc , through a buy price function p(·), such
that bc = p(Akc). The exact dependence, i.e., the shape of
p(Akc), is crucial in determining whether joining a coalition
is a sensible move or not. As an example, p(Akc) = b0
means that there is no incentive at all to form coalitions. On
the other hand, functions such as p(Akc) = b0 − logAkc ,
p(Akc) = b0−A
2
kc
, p(x) = b0− expAkc provide increasingly
strong incentives.
Recall that a charging station joining a coalition forfeits its
freedom to decide the sell price sc. Hence, stations will not
join a coalition if the incentive represented by the reduction
in buy price bc is not high enough.
We also assume that selling prices are chosen from a finite-
sized set P . This assumption simplifies our discussion but, as
we will see in Sec. V, has no impact on the overall level of
realism of the model.
IV. THE MARKET GAME
Game theory [1] studies the interaction among rational
agents, called players. Players can choose among a set of
moves and aim at maximizing their payoff. The payoff obtained
by each player depends not only on its move, but also upon the
other players’ moves. This makes game theory a particularly
powerful and convenient tool to study cooperation and conflict
mechanisms, such as the EV charging model we have outlined
above. We thus define the charging market game as follows.
Players: We have two categories of players:
• the vehicles in V ;
• the charging stations in C.
Payoffs: Vehicles aim at optimizing the time-price trade-
off in (1), which represents the cost they incur2. As for
charging stations, their payoff is represented by the following
monetary gain:
1[c/∈k0] [Ac(sc − bc)− fc] . (3)
Notice that, from (3), it follows that equilibrium payoffs for
charging stations are never negative.
Moves: Vehicles have to select a charging station, thus
the set of their possible moves corresponds to the set C of
charging stations. Charging stations, on the other hand, can
decide to:
• form a new coalition formed by themselves alone;
• exit the market, i.e., joining coalition k0;
• leave their current coalition and join one of the existing
ones.
Recall that the game players are vehicles and charging
stations, not coalitions, which therefore do not make any move.
Indeed, the coalition prices are completely determined by the
composition of the existing coalitions and by the behavior of
vehicles.
2Recall that vehicles with no ITS support will still optimize (1), but
accounting for an incorrect value of wc.
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Equilibrium: A strategy profile is a mapping of vehicles
onto charging stations and of charging stations onto coalitions.
In this work, we use the standard definition of Nash equilib-
rium: a strategy profile from which no player has interest to
unilaterally deviate, i.e., when no vehicle selects a different
station and no station changes coalition.
V. COMPLEXITY ISSUES
The model we have described so far is characterized by sev-
eral variables, accounting for both topological and economic
aspects. Among the former, our model lists:
• a set of charging stations c ∈ C, with their locations λc;
• a set of vehicles v ∈ V , with their origin, destination, and
points at which they become aware of their low battery,
i.e., αv , ωv , and ηv);
• the distances t(x1, x2) between any two points (x1, x2)
in the road topology.
As for the economic aspects, our model comprises:
• the fixed costs to be paid by charging stations fc, c ∈ C;
• the buy price bc, c ∈ C, through function p(·);
• the set P of possible sell prices.
In order to find an equilibrium, our task is to identify:
• a mapping of vehicles in V onto stations in C;
• a mapping of stations in C onto coalitions in K;
• a mapping of stations in C onto sell prices in P ;
such that no vehicle or station would deviate from them. In
other words, each step of the game requires the identification
of (i) all possible coalitions formed by the |C| charging
stations; (ii) for each coalition, the |P| prices a station c ∈ C
can choose from; (iii) for each coalition-price combination,
(up to) |C| possible charging stations, among which the |V|
vehicles can choose.
The possible number of ways the stations in C can form
coalitions corresponds to the number of combinations of |C|
elements, i.e., 2|C|−1. It follows that the number of solutions
to examine is:
2|C|−1 · (|P|+ 1)|C| · |C||V| = O
(
|C||V|+|C|
)
. (4)
The number in (4) is clearly overwhelming, even for unreal-
istically small instances of the scenario.
We therefore try to reduce the overwhelming complexity of
finding an equilibrium by means of some simplifying assump-
tions, and check that such assumptions do not jeopardize the
realism of our model.
A. Vehicles book their battery replacement
A first assumption we can make is that vehicles can book,
e.g., via an existing ITS, their battery replacement, as soon as
they realize that their charge level is low. Such an approach is
used, among others, by the Pod Point project [18]. This does
not mean that they will not wait in line if they arrive at the
station earlier than the allotted time. However, it has a very
important consequence:
Proposition 5.1: The trip time of each vehicle depends
solely on the moves of the vehicles booking before it.
This, in turn, yields the following important result.
Theorem 5.2: The strategy obtained under the assumption
that each vehicle books a station when it needs to replace its
battery is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: The vehicle booking first will not deviate from the
strategy. The payoff of the second one will only be affected
by the decision of the first vehicle, so the second vehicle will
not deviate from the strategy either. By induction, no other
vehicle will deviate.
Theorem 5.2 yields a huge reduction of the complexity,
indeed we can replace the third term in (4) with 1, obtaining:
2|C|−1 · (|P|+ 1)|C| = O
(
|P||C|
)
. (5)
Importantly, in (5) we have no dependence upon the num-
ber |V| of vehicles. Therefore, we can easily take into account
realistic scenarios with heavy traffic levels and/or high pene-
tration rates.
B. Deciding the prices
Let us assume that the coalitions are given and, hence, the
buying prices bc are known. Recall that P is the finite set of
price levels, and that we impose sc ∈ P , ∀c ∈ C.
The prices of all charging stations start at the minimum
level, i.e., sc = minP , ∀c ∈ C. Then, coalitions take turns
incrementing the price of at most one of their stations, by at
most one level, until no coalition wants to increase any price
anymore. Such a situation is not necessarily an equilibrium, as
some coalitions may want to decrease their prices. Therefore,
coalitions take turns reducing the price of at most one of
their stations, by at most one level, until no coalition wants to
decrease any price anymore.
Let us now consider the maximum number of solutions
evaluated in this way. In the worst case, the price of each
station goes from minP to maxP , and then goes back
to minP . Therefore, the complexity of an “up-and-down”
round is bounded by:
2 · |C| · |P| = O(|C| · |P|).
Clearly, we are not guaranteed that after one “up-and-down”
round we reach an equilibrium, i.e., that now no coalition
would like to increase their prices again. The process may go
on indefinitely. This is a consequence of the so-called “perfect
rationality” assumption which is commonly made in game
theory: each player is perfectly able to predict the opponents’
moves, and to change her own accordingly. However, such an
assumption is unrealistic in most practical cases, and is often
dropped in favor of the notion of bounded rationality: each
player will be able to reconstruct in her mind only the next r ∈
N moves of her opponents. Practical experiments [19], [20]
show that players significantly underestimate their opponents’
rationality, and suggest a value of r below 5.
Assuming bounded rationality, the complexity of the price
decision is bounded by 2r · |C| · |P|, and the total complexity
(5) becomes:
2|C|−1 · 2r|C||P| = O
(
2|C|
)
. (6)
Adding parameter r allows us to study how the coalition
revenue depends on the level of rationality employed in
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defining their price policy, i.e., if “more clever” coalitions have
a competitive advantage.
C. Forming the coalitions
We follow a similar approach in determining how the
coalitions are formed.
Each charging station starts by forming its own coalition,
i.e., kc = c, ∀c ∈ C, and k0 = ∅. Then, charging stations
take turns in deciding which coalitions to join. Each charging
station can choose among at most |C|+1 coalitions, including
the current one and k0. Thus, a “coalition forming” round
includes exactly |C| turns, during which at most |C| + 1
alternatives are examined. It follows that the complexity of
each round is bounded by |C|2.
Again, we assume that players have bounded rationality r,
i.e., at most r “coalition forming” rounds are performed. We
can thus update the overall complexity (6) to:
r|C|2 · 2r|C||P| = 2r2|C|2 · |C||P| = O(|C|3). (7)
D. Summary and discussion
We have been able to move from the worse-than-exponential
complexity in (4) to the cubic complexity in (7), by subse-
quently addressing the following three stages:
• vehicles choosing the charging station to use;
• coalitions deciding their price policy;
• charging stations joining a coalition.
If dealt with naivety, each of these stages would have expo-
nential complexity. However, we have shown that if vehicles
can book their charging station, the complexity of the first
stage reduces to a constant. Furthermore, the complexity of
the latter two stages becomes polynomial as a consequence of
the fact that players have bounded rationality.
Interestingly, none of the assumptions we made impairs
the realism of our model. Specifically, vehicles do book their
replacement [18] and players, including businesses, do have
bounded rationality [19], [20].
We can therefore be quite satisfied with the final complexity
reached in (7), for a variety of reasons.
First and foremost, cubic is better than exponential. Roughly
speaking, it means that we can tackle realistically-sized sce-
narios with a complexity comparable to that of linear pro-
gramming problems. Furthermore, the dominant term in the
expression of the complexity only depends on the number
of charging stations we have. In other words, the number of
price levels in P and the rationality r do have an impact on
the computation time, however as the values of the involved
parameters grow very large, it is |C| that dominates. This
means that we will be able to increase r and |P| as much as
needed, without incurring in an exceedingly high complexity.
VI. SCENARIO AND SETTINGS
We now apply our model to a realistic scenario, so as to get
some insight in the way the decisions of individual charging
stations, coalitions of stations and vehicles interact.
We consider the road topology in Figure 1, depicting a
10 × 10 km2 section of the urban area of Ingolstadt, Germany.
Fig. 1. Road topology used for our experiments.
There are |V| = 300 vehicles traveling on the topology,
each needing to stop at one of |C| = 14 charging stations.
Charging stations are located at major intersections throughout
the topology. For each station, we set the number of service
stalls to 6 and the service time, i.e., the time to replace a
vehicle battery, to 60 s. Travel times within the topology are
obtained through SUMO [21] simulations, tabulated and input
to our model. As detailed in the Appendix, the waiting time at
a charging station, i.e., the time a vehicle waits in line there,
varies depending on the number of vehicles it finds already
waiting at the charging station.
Unless otherwise specified, the fixed cost is fc = 50 for each
station, the possible sell prices are P = {9, 10, . . . , 17, 18} and
the buy prices are determined as follows:
bc = 3− L log10Akc . (8)
In (8), the parameter L ∈ R expresses how strong the incentive
to create a coalition is; we set its default value to L = 1.
As a consequence, in the default settings, the buy prices
approximately range between 0.5 and 3. Finally, we set the
rationality parameter to r = 20.
VII. RESULTS
For each case study, we let the value of the coefficient K
vary between 5 and 50, with the latter depicting very impatient
drivers, and the former representing the lowest value drivers
could give to their time (at least in popular culture [22]).
Also, for each case study, we compare the cases in which
an ITS system is available, i.e., vehicles can correctly esti-
mate wc, and in which vehicles have no ITS support, i.e., will
always assume wc = 0.
We start from the baseline scenario described in Sec. VI,
and investigate the prices paid by the vehicles and the coali-
tions formed by charging stations. Then, we look at how
anti-cooperative behaviors from the charging stations can be
countered by acting on the number and size of the coalitions
(Sec. VII-B) and on the coalition incentive L (Sec. VII-C).
For each of these anti-trust strategies, we are also interested
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Fig. 2. Baseline scenario: coalitions size (a), prices (b), vehicle trip time (c), with and without ITS support.
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Fig. 3. Baseline scenario with ITS support. Breakdown of trip times for the 10% vehicles with longest trip time (a), the average (b) and the 10% vehicles
with shortest trip time (c).
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Fig. 4. Peak-time scenario: coalitions size (a), prices (b), vehicle trip time (c), with and without ITS support.
to check whether the availability of ITS support has any impact
on its effectiveness.
Fig. 2 depicts the behavior of the system under our baseline
scenario. The first aspect of interest is the way coalitions are
formed, shown in Fig. 2(a). We can see that the incentive to
form coalitions given by L = 1 is quite effective. There are
never more than two coalitions. More interestingly, when the
vehicles give to their time a very high or a very low value,
there is only one coalition, attaining the lowest possible buy
price bc. Thanks to the large number of vehicles existing in
the topology, no charging station decides not to operate, i.e.,
to join coalition k0, except when K ≤ 10.
Such a behavior, highlighted by Fig. 2(a), can be explained
by looking at the prices portrayed in Fig. 2(b). When K is low,
vehicles tend to select the cheapest station, (almost) regardless
of its distance. Therefore, stations will react by selecting the
lowest possible price and forming a single coalition so as
to enjoy the lowest buy price bc. Then, since all stations
have the same price, vehicles will optimize their objective, as
in (1), by selecting their closest station. It follows that stations
in disadvantageous locations will go out of business, being
unable to further reduce their prices to attract more vehicles.
In other words, they will join coalition k0.
As the value of time K increases, we can see another
interesting effect: two coalitions are formed, as shown in
Fig. 2(a), and the average sell and buy prices tend to remain
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constant (red and gray curves in Fig. 2(b)). Indeed, in these
cases, vehicles always select the closest charging station and
the prices tend to reach their maximum value.
Also, by comparing red and gray curves in Fig. 2(b),
we observe that the average price paid by vehicles3,
i.e., 1|V|
∑
v∈V sv, can be lower than the average price charged
by stations, i.e., 1|C|
∑
c∈C sc. Clearly, stations charging a
cheaper price attract more vehicles.
As K further increases, we enter a regime where vehicles
have a strong tendency to select the closest station, no matter
which price they have to pay. Stations react by charging the
maximum possible prices (Fig. 2(b)), and again forming a
single coalition (Fig. 2(a)) to minimize the buy price bc and,
thus, maximize their profit.
Finally, let us look at the trip times portrayed in Fig. 2(c).
The plot shows the average, as well as the 10th and the 90th
percentiles, of vehicle trip times. This includes:
• detour time from the original route to the charging station
and back;
• waiting time in line at the charging station;
• service time, i.e., the time required for battery replace-
ment.
In spite of the variability due to the differences in the routes,
the trend is clear. As K grows to 25, the trip times decrease.
For higher values of K , stations always charge the highest
possible price, and vehicles always select the closest station,
3We abuse the notation, indicating by sv the price paid by vehicle v, i.e.,
the sell price sc charged by station c selected by vehicle v.
thus attaining the lowest possible trip time.
The role of ITS: In all the above cases, we can see that the
availability of ITS support for vehicles consistently implies
lower prices and shorter trip times. While the fact that ITS
support shortens trip times is quite obvious, the impact of
such a support on prices is not.
The intuition is that when vehicles underestimate their
waiting times, they are more likely to select a more expensive
charging station, as their value of objective (1) is still low.
Surprisingly enough, if vehicles with no ITS support always
assume that waiting times are very long, prices are still higher
than in the case with ITS support. The reason is as follows:
vehicles select more expensive charging stations in order to
avoid further increasing their objective values. Therefore, any
incorrect estimation of waiting times yields higher trip times
and higher prices – that knowledge is power has long been
known in fields other than networking or game theory.
In Fig. 3, we focus on the case with ITS and we seek to
understand the relevance of each of the trip time components,
for vehicles with short, average, and long total trip times.
First, we recall that the service time is constant and quite
short; this is due to the fact that batteries are replaced and not
recharged. Also, the detour time varies little as K increases.
Indeed, waiting times are a very important part of the total
trip time, and they represent the most significant difference
between vehicles with short and long trip times. Finally, lower
values of K correspond to longer waiting times.
As mentioned, our model can account for those scenarios
in which batteries are charged on the spot instead of being
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Fig. 5. At least three coalitions enforced: coalitions size (a), prices (b), vehicle trip time (c), with and without ITS support.
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Fig. 6. At most five members per coalitions permitted: coalitions size (a), prices (b), vehicle trip time (c), with and without ITS support.
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replaced. In that case, service times (the black area in Fig. 3)
would be longer and, more importantly, not uniform as they
would depend on factors like the charge level of each vehicle.
A. Peak-time scenario
We all know that prices are formed through the balance of
demand and offer. In the following, we explore what happens
if such a balance is changed, e.g., during peak traffic hours.
Specifically, we increase the number of vehicles that need to
replace their battery to |V| = 500.
The effect, shown in Fig. 4, is quite clear. Firstly, a single,
giant coalition forms sooner, i.e., for lower values of K . Sec-
ondly, costs and trip times both increase (notice the different
scale in Fig. 4(c)). Thirdly, the impact of the presence of ITS is
less significant. Intuitively, in this scenario there are so many
vehicles that charging stations can enforce whatever pricing
policy they see fit, and still have customers. Finally, looking
at Fig. 4(b), we note that there is a wider spread between sell
and buy prices.
B. Countering trusts: number and size of coalitions
As we have seen from Fig. 2(a), the system naturally drifts
towards very few, big coalitions, which can easily maximize
their profit by increasing the prices. Many countries deter such
aggressive cartels through anti-trust regulations, forbidding
large aggregations of subjects operating in the same market.
We model these regulations by mandating that at least three
coalitions (not including k0) be formed, for all values of K .
The results are summarized in Fig. 5.
The first thing Fig. 5(a) highlights is that the third coalition
rarely includes more than one station: charging stations behave
as if they were trying to elude anti-trust regulations – no
surprise there. Nonetheless, the presence of the extra coalition
has a significant impact on prices: as shown in Fig. 5(b),
the regime in which all stations charge the maximum price
is reached only for K ≥ 40.
As far as trip times are concerned, Fig. 5(c) shows that they
tend to be slightly lower, and to decrease more steadily, than
in the baseline case (Fig. 2(c)).
Even better results are obtained, as we can see from Fig. 6, if
at most five members per coalition are permitted. In this case,
the average of the sell prices sc, hence the average prices
at which vehicles buy, is lower (see Fig. 6(b)). Such price
reduction leads to no degradation in terms of trip time (see
Fig. 6(c)). Furthermore, looking at Fig. 6(a), we observe that
we always have two coalitions for any value of K .
Finally, it is important to note that none of the above settings
reduces the penalty – in terms of energy prices – that vehicles
incur if no ITS system is available.
C. Countering trusts: removing and reversing the coalition
incentive
In some cases, it may prove difficult to directly enforce
a minimum number of coalitions, or a maximum size of
the coalitions. Thus, here we try to act upon the coalition
incentive L with the goal of obtaining lower prices for end
users. We start by setting L = 0, i.e., we remove any incentive
for charging stations to form big coalitions.
A first, unexpected result can be seen from Fig. 7(a):
even if the incentive represented by a positive value of L is
removed, coalitions are still formed. This is due to a secondary
effect of belonging to a coalition, i.e., the fact that prices are
decided coalition-wise. It follows that two charging stations
that would otherwise be competing against each other can
agree on a common price policy. Note, however, that the curves
in Fig. 7(a) do not sum up to |C| = 14, as the composition
of several small coalitions that originate is not reported in
the plot. Also, from Fig. 7(a) we observe that now there is a
high number of non-operating charging stations. Indeed, due
to the higher buy prices bc (and the lower sell prices sc),
these stations cannot make a profit, especially when K is low
(Fig. 7(b)).
By looking at Fig. 7(b) and Fig. 2(b), we can see that sell
prices sc are comparatively lower. Indeed, there are always
some stations belonging to minor coalitions (see Fig. 7(a)) that
compete with larger coalitions by lowering their sell prices.
Finally, observe from Fig. 7(c) that trip times tend to be
longer than in the previous cases, especially for low values
of K , as a consequence of the lower number of operating
stations.
These results motivate us to ask a further question: what if
we reverse the coalition incentive, i.e., set L to a negative
value? Such a scenario could model those cases in which
a high energy consumption is discouraged rather than en-
couraged, e.g., due to environmental concerns. Indeed, this
is exactly the way residential consumers are currently billed
by electric companies. The results are summarized in Fig. 8.
We can see the direct effect of having L < 0 by looking
at Fig. 8(b): prices are remarkably higher than in the previous
scenarios. Surprisingly, in spite of this effect, Fig. 8(a) shows
that a sizable coalition, as big as 10 stations for some values
of K , is nonetheless formed . Similarly to the case L = 0, this
is due to stations that find forming a coalition more profitable
than competing against each other. Indeed, our model proves to
be remarkably good at capturing the anti-competitive behavior
that charging stations are likely to mutuate from traditional
ones. Also notice, from Fig. 8(a), that there is a higher number
of charging stations that do not find it convenient to operate
when K is small, essentially due to the higher energy costs
to offset. Consistently, trip times (Fig. 8(c)) tend to be longer
than in the other cases.
Again, no matter the anti-trust mechanism in place, ITS
support is always associated to lower prices.
D. Rationality
At last, we look at the number of rounds that, as described
in Section V, are needed to reach an equilibrium. Recall
that we have limited their number through the rationality
parameter r = 20.
Table I shows that the number of iterations is always
significantly smaller than the limit represented by r. This
has two important consequences. First, assuming a bounded
rationality has no impact on the results for the scenario under
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Fig. 7. Scenario with L = 0: coalitions size (a), prices (b), vehicle trip time (c), with and without ITS support.
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Fig. 8. Scenario with L = −0.5: coalitions size (a), prices (b), vehicle trip time (c), with and without ITS support.
study, i.e., keeping the traditional assumption of unbounded
rationality would have yielded the same results.
More importantly, these figures show that, through our
model, we manage to find an equilibrium for a realistic
scenario with a limited number of iterations, hence in a short
time. This achievement is important in light of an on-line usage
of the system.
Also notice that extreme values of K typically yield a
smaller number of iterations. This is due to vehicle behavior
being less likely to change as a consequence of price or
coalition-related decisions, which are in turn less likely to be
reverted.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a comprehensive model for networks of elec-
tric vehicles, accounting for the most relevant players (electric
vehicles, charging stations and the coalitions they form). We
also accounted for the way players’ actions influence each
other and for the possible intervention of anti-trust regulators.
We described an algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium for
TABLE I
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS NEEDED TO REACH AN EQUILIBRIUM
Scenario K = 5 K = 25 K = 50
Baseline 2 7 1
L = 0 2 10 2
L = −0.5 3 13 5
Anti-trust 2 12 9
our model, and discussed its complexity. Finally, we applied
our model to a set of realistic scenarios, highlighting some
non-obvious aspects of the behavior that can be expected
from charging station owners. The value assigned by vehicle
drivers to their time proved to be a fundamental parameter of
the system, which has a relevant impact not only on vehicle
trip times but also on the prices charged by stations and the
way the latter group into coalitions. Finally, equilibria have
been reached with quite a small number of iterations, always
smaller than the rationality limit r. Due to its flexibility, our
model can be adapted with trivial modifications to virtually any
market situation. For instance, future research could further
investigate interventions by market regulators (e.g., city or
local authorities) on anticompetitive behaviors of charging
stations. Also, the case in which fixed costs depend upon the
coalition size can be examined.
The first aspect we looked at was the impact on the
availability of ITS on the prices paid by the vehicles and
the coalitions formed by the charging stations. We found
that when no ITS support is available, charging stations
have an incentive to increase their prices. Another interesting
observation concerns coalitions: they exhibit a clear tendency
to form coalitions, with one of such coalitions aggregating
most of the active stations. This happens even if energy prices
are determined in order to discourage such a behavior. Indeed,
the main advantage that charging stations obtain from forming
a coalition is not represented by lower energy prices, but by the
possibility of enacting a common price policy – i.e., to form
a trust. In all cases, the availability of ITS support invariably
9
results not only in shorter trip and waiting times for vehicles,
but also in lower prices.
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APPENDIX
THE WAITING AND SERVICE TIME wc
In the following, we give a closed-form expression of the
waiting/service time wc.
Let us consider a generic vehicle arriving at station c, which
is equipped with σ replacement stalls. Let τ be the replacement
time, and n be the number of vehicles already waiting at the
charging station before the tagged vehicle. The waiting and
service time wc is given by:
wc =


τ if n < σ
τ
2
+ τ
n− σ
σ
+ τ otherwise.
(9)
The first line of (9) applies when the arriving vehicle finds a
free stall; in this case, its battery is immediately replaced in
time τ . If all stalls are busy, instead, the vehicle has to wait
in line. It will have to wait for the vehicles being served to
finish (τ/2 on average), then for the full service time τ of
the (n − σ)/σ other vehicles currently in line. Finally, the
tagged vehicle will be served in time τ .
It is very important to stress that the expression in (9) also
holds if batteries are recharged on the spot, and not replaced
– the only difference being a higher, and possibly vehicle-
specific, value of τ .
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